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RECENT CASE NOTES
rule that the liquidating partner may borrow in the firm name and use firm
property as security for such purposes, as an exception to the general rule
that a surviving partner cannot borrow money and bind the partnership
after dissolution, appears to be making an inroad upon the prior rulings in
Indiana on this subject.1 5  I. K.
TRUSTS-BANKS AND BANKING-SET-OFFS AGAINST TRuSr FuND.-Appellee
Tractor Company delivered a tractor to an Equipment Company, an inde-
pendent sales agency, under a conditional sales contract, the Equipment Com-
pany executing its note for the wholesale price and assigning the purchase
order of its customer and all moneys due thereunder to appellee. The cus-
tomer, through its treasurer, issued a warrant to the Equipment Company, who
indorsed it and deposited it in appellant bank to credit its checking account.
The Equipment Company was indebted to the bank on an overdue note, and
appellant credited a part of the deposit to its overdue note. Upon suit by
appellee for the amount applied to the note, recovery was allowed, and appeal
taken. Held, affirmed. The bank, not having changed position in reliance
on the buyer's apparent title, nor having given value, could not set off the
buyer's pre-existing debt to the bank against a deposit to defeat the condi-
tional seller's claim to the deposit. A bank may not appropriate funds
deposited by a trustee in his own name to payment of a personal pre-existing
debt of the trustee, even if the bank had no knowledge of the true owner's
interest at the time of appropriation of the funds.1
There is no doubt that where no other right is involved, money deposited
in a bank creates the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and
the depositor, the money becoming the property of the bank, and the bank
having the right to apply a sufficient amount of the deposit to the payment
of any debt due from the depositor to the bank.2 At the other extreme, there
is no doubt that where the bank knows a third person has an interest in a
deposit made in another individual's name, the bank is precluded from apply-
ing those funds to the depositor's indebtedness to the bank.3 However,
between these two extremes is an intermediate step in which trust funds are
deposited to the trustee's personal account and the bank, not knowing they
are trust funds, attempts to apply them to the depositor's indebtedness to the
bank.
On this last point, there is a great'split of authority, and there has been
a further split by distinguishing between cases where the depositor's consent
15 Hamilton v. Seamon (1848), 1 Ind. 185; Conklin v. Ogborn (1856), 7
Ind. 553. Also, see Hayden v. Cretcher (1881), 75 Ind. 108.
'Peoples State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1938, Ind.), 12 N. E.
(2d) 123.2 Bedford Bank v. Acoam (1890), 125 Ind. 584, 25 N. E. 713; Lamb,
Receiver, v. Morris (1888), 118 Ind. 179, 20 N. E. 746; Second National Bank
v. Hill (1881), 76 Ind. 223, 40 A. R. 239; Aurora National Bank v. Dils
(1897), 18 Ind. App. 319, 48 N. E. 19.
3 Shepard v. Meridian National Bank (1897), 149 Ind. 532, 48 N. E. 346;
Bundy v. Town of Monticello (1882), 84 Ind. 119; Davis v. Indiana National
Bank (1920), 73 Ind. App. 563, 126 N. E. 489; Miami County Bank v. State
(1915), 61 Ind. App. 360, 112 N. E. 40; Martin v. First National Bank (1931),
51 F. (2d) 840.
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was had to the set-off, where such applications have been allowed, 4 and those
where the depositor-trustee has not consented to such application. The weight
of authority is against the holding of the principal case,5 and is, in effect,
that the bank where funds are deposited in which a third person has an
interest may apply the deposit to the individual debt of the depositor, so
long as it has no notice nor knowledge sufficient to put it on guard as to
the character of the deposit.o This line of authority would seem to follow the
federal cases, although there seems to be some confusion as to what the
federal rule actually is. 7 The policy of this line of cases, refusing recovery
of trust funds applied to the depositor's perional debt, is that if recovery
were permitted and a duty of inquiry as to the source from which the debtor
acquired the money thus imposed on the bank, the effect would be to disorganize
business operations and entail a great amount of uncertainty and risk on
business. 8
As contrasted to this rule, there is the so-called "equitable rule," which
states that a bank though having no knowledge, either express or implied,
4McEwen v. Davis (1872), 39 Ind. 109 (Partner deposited partnership
funds to his own credit, the bank had no knowledge of the character of the
funds, and the bank was allowed, with consent of the depositor, to apply the
fund to satisfaction of the depositor's note) ; Metz v. First National Bank
(1928), 45 Ida. 472, 262 P. 1051; Shuman v. Citizen's State Bank (1914),
27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388; Tough v. Citizen's State Bank (1913), 89
Kan. 583, 132 P. 174; First State Bank v. Hill (1911, Tex. Civ. App.), 141
S. W. 300; Kimmell v. Bean (1904), 68 Kan. 598, 75 P. 1118; Smith v. Des
Moines National Bank (1899), 107 Iowa 620, 78 N. W. 238.
5 Supra, note 1.
6 Kemfner v. Auburn Park Trust & Savings Bank (1931), 344 Ill. 200,
176 N. E. 363; Clay County Bank v. First National Bank (1929), 12 S. W.
(2d) 595, 178 Ark. 989; Metz v. First National Bank (1928), 45 Ida. 472,
262 P. 1051; First National Bank v. Duncan (1927), 127 Oki. 226, 260 P.
491; Cable v. Iowa State Savings Bank (1923), 197 Iowa 393, 194 N. W. 957;
Arnold v. San Ramon Valley Bank (1921), 184 Cal. 632, 194 P. 1912; Steere
v. Stock Yards National Bank (1921, Tex. Civ. App.), 266 S. W. 531; McStay
Supply Co. v. Stoddard (1912), 35 Nev. 284, 132 P. 545; First National
Bank v. Kenney (1911), 116 Md. 24, 81 A. 227; Shuman v. Citizen's State
Bank (1914), 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388; Kimmell v. Bean (1904), 68 Kan.
598, 75 P. 1118; Hatch v. Fourth National Bank (1895), 147 N. Y. 184, 41
N. E. 403; Wilson v. Farmer's First National Bank (1914), 176 Mo. App.
73, 162 S. W. 1047; Garrison v. Union Trust Co. (1905), 139 Mich. 392, 102
N. W. 978; Titcomb v. Richter (1915), 89 Conn. 226, 93 A. 526; Burnham v.
Holt (1843), 14 N. H. 367. This view is expressed also in Pomeroy Eq. Jur.,
Sec. 1048, and by the American Law Institute's Restatment of Law of Trusts,
Sec. 324 (h), which reads, "If a bank in which trust funds have been
deposited accepts in payment of a personal indebtedness of the trustee to the
bank a check payable out of the trust fund, the bank is liable for participation
in the breach of trust if, but only if, it had notice that trust funds were being
so used."
7 Central National Bank v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1881), 104 U. S.
54, 26 L. Ed. 409; Union Stock Yards Bank v. Gillespie (1889), 137 U. S.
411, 11 S. Ct. 118; In Re Greater Pythian Temple Ass'n of New York (1937),
19 F. Supp. 762; Commercial National Bank v. Stockyards Loan Co. (1926),
16 F. (2d) 911. But see Citizens & Southern Bank v. Fayram (1927), 21
F. (2d) 998, which holds that there must be a change of position, which
would make the Indiana cases come under the rule as set out in this case.
8 Hatch v. Fourth National Bank (1895), 147 V. Y. 184, 41 N. E. 403.
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that a third person has an interest in the funds deposited, cannot apply those
funds to the indebtedness of the individual depositor, unless the bank has
changed its position, given value, or unless superior equities have been raised
in its favor.9 In these cases, there is no distinction, and apparently no cause
for distinction between an express trustee and an agent, bailee, collector of
rents, or anyone else in a fiduciary capacity.O Indiana follows this equitable
rule and there seems to be no doubt that it will continue to do so. The prin-
ciples which the Indiana courts follow are so well settled and deeply rooted
in the history of the cases that there is no question which rule precedent
points out. The reasoning of the Indiana Courts is that if the fund in
question is a trust fund, its character is not changed by a deposit to the
individual account of the trustee, and unless it has passed into the hands
of parties for value without notice, the court will separate the trust funds
from other funds, if there has been a co-mingling, and restore them to the
beneficiary."1 The point stressed in this line of authority is not lack of
knowledge or notice, but that the fund must have passed into the hands of
a party for value, a bona fide purchaser. It is to be noticed that the cases
which permit the set-off and refuse recovery do not take into consideration
this factor that value is given and that the holder is a bona fide purchaser.
Better reasoning would seem to favor the line of authority followed in
Indiana, as there is no reason for treating trust funds differently from other
trust property; and it should be possible for a beneficiary to follow the fund
until it does come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, at which
time a superior equity would arise in favor of that purchaser. Where the
bank has not changed its position or lost anything by the deposit which it
has attempted to apply to the trustee's indebtedness, there is no reason for
allowing the set-off, thus fostering a conversion of trust funds. And where
such set-off is attempted, it is such a conversion of trust funds as to bring
the case within the language of the Indiana rule, that the bank is liable
"if it participates in the profits or fruits of the fraud."12  R. K. R.
SacuRrY-DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEED.-In return for a sum then borrowed
a certain trust company took two notes that were secured by a single mortgage.
The notes were for $500 and $3,500 respectively and matured at the same
9 Brown v. Maqujres Real Estate Agency (1937, Mo.), 101 S. W. (2d) 41;
Allen Dudley & Co. v. First National Bank (1932), 122 Neb. 443, 240 N. W.
525; Agard v. Peoples National Bank (1927), 116 Minn. 438, 211 N. W. 825;
Gibbs v. Commercial & Savings Bank (1926), 50 S. D. 134, 208 N. W. 779;
Shotwell v. Sioux Falls Savings Bank (1914), 34 S. D. 109, 147 N. W. 288;
Cady v. South Omaha National Bank (1896), 46 Neb. 756, 65 N. W. 906;
Burtnett v. First National Bank (1878), 38 Mich. 630.
10 Central National Bank v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1881), 104 U. S.
54, 26 L. Ed. 409.
11Porter v. Roseman (1905), 165 Ind. 255, 74 N. E. 1105; Pierce v.
Dill (1897), 149 Ind. 136, 48 N. E. 788; Citizen's Bank v. Harrison (1891),
127 Ind. 128, 26 N. E. 683; Bundy, Receiver, v. Town of Monticello (1882),
84 Ind. 119; Rottger, Receiver, v. First Merchants' National Bank (1933),
98 Ind. App. 139, 184 N. E. 267; Terra Haute Trust Co. v. Scott (1932), 94
Ind. App. 461, 181 N. E. 369; Continental National Bank v. McClure (1916),
60 Ind. App. 553, 111 N. E. 191; Shoppert v. Indiana National Bank (1907),
41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515.
12 Miami County Bank v. State (1915), 61 Ind. App. 360, 112 N. E. 40.
